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We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates
how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings and providing liquidity
to other investors. Research in this area is currently evolving into a broader agenda emphasizing the
role of financial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This research has the potential to
explain so-called "market anomalies" and inform welfare and policy debates about asset markets. We
begin with examples of demand shocks that generate mispricings, arguing that they can stem from
behavioral or from institutional considerations. We next survey, and nest within a simple model, the
following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental and non-fundamental, (ii) short-selling
costs, (iii) leverage and margin constraints, and (iv) constraints on equity capital. We finally discuss
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Standard models of asset pricing assume a representative agent who participates in all markets
costlessly. Equilibrium prices in these models are tied to the representative agent's consumption,
which coincides with the aggregate consumption in the economy. The relationship between prices
and consumption is summarized in the consumption CAPM, according to which an asset's expected
return in excess of the riskfree rate is proportional to the asset's covariance with aggregate con-
sumption. Intuitively, assets that correlate positively with consumption add to the risk borne by
the representative agent and must o®er high expected return as compensation.
The relationship between risk and expected return predicted by standard models appears to
be at odds with a number of stylized facts commonly referred to as market anomalies. Leading
anomalies include (i) short-run momentum, the tendency of an asset's recent performance to con-
tinue into the near future, (ii) long-run reversal, the tendency of performance over a longer history
to revert, (iii) the value e®ect, the tendency of an asset's ratio of price to accounting measures of
value to predict negatively future returns, (iv) the high volatility of asset prices relative to mea-
sures of discounted future payo® streams, and (v) post-earnings-announcement drift, the tendency
of stocks' earning surprises to predict positively future returns.1 Reconciling these anomalies with
standard models requires explaining variation in asset risk: for example, in the case of short-run
momentum, one would have to explain why good recent performance renders an asset riskier and
more positively correlated with aggregate consumption. A recent literature pursues explanations
along these lines by introducing more general utility functions for the representative agent. Yet,
reconciling standard models with all the anomalies, and in a way consistent with their quantitative
magnitude remains elusive.
The anomalies listed above concern the predictability of asset returns based on past prices and
earnings. An additional set of anomalies concern the relative prices of assets with closely related
payo®s. For example, (i) \Siamese-twin" stocks, with claims to almost identical dividend streams,
can trade at signi¯cantly di®erent prices, (ii) stocks of a parent and a subsidiary company can trade
at prices under which the remainder of the parent company's assets has negative value, and (iii)
newly issued \on-the-run" bonds can trade at signi¯cantly higher prices than older \o®-the-run"
bonds with almost identical payo®s.2 Anomalies concerning relative prices have been documented
1See, for example, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) for evidence on short-run momentum, DeBondt & Thaler (1985)
for long-run reversal, Fama & French (1992) for the value e®ect, LeRoy & Porter (1981) & Shiller (1981) for excess
volatility, and Bernard & Thomas (1989) for post-earnings-announcement drift. See also the surveys by Fama (1991)
and Schwert (2003).
2See, for example, Rosenthal & Young (1990) and Dabora & Froot (1999) for evidence on Siamese-twin stocks,
1for a more limited set of assets, partly because of the scarcity of asset pairs with closely related
payo®s. At the same time, these anomalies are particularly hard to reconcile with standard models.
Indeed, while standard models may o®er slightly di®erent predictions as to how risk and expected
returns are related, they all imply the law of one price, i.e., assets with identical payo®s must
trade at the same price. In the previous examples, however, di®erences in payo®s appear to be
insigni¯cant relative to the observed price di®erences.
Understanding why anomalies exist and are not eliminated requires a careful study of the
process of arbitrage: who are the arbitrageurs, what are the constraints and limitations they face,
and why arbitrage can fail to bring prices close to the fundamental values implied by standard
models. This is the focus of a recent literature on the limits of arbitrage. This article surveys
important theoretical developments in that literature, nests them within a simple model, and
suggests directions for future research.
Limits of arbitrage are commonly viewed as one of two building blocks needed to explain anoma-
lies. The other building block are demand shocks experienced by investors other than arbitrageurs.
Anomalies are commonly interpreted as arising because demand shocks push prices away from fun-
damental values and arbitrageurs are unable to correct the discrepancies. Such \non-fundamental"
shocks to demand are often attributed to investor irrationality. In this sense, research on the lim-
its of arbitrage is part of the behavioral ¯nance agenda to explain anomalies based on investors'
psychological biases.3
This article departs from the conventional view in two related respects. First, it argues that
research on the limits of arbitrage is relevant not only for behavioral explanations of anomalies but
also for the broader study of asset pricing. Indeed, psychological biases are not the only source
of non-fundamental demand shocks: such shocks can also arise because of institutional frictions
relating to contracting and agency, as the examples in the next section show. Research on the
limits of arbitrage characterizes how non-fundamental demand shocks, whether behavioral or not,
impact prices.
According to the conventional view, non-fundamental demand shocks concern investors other
than arbitrageurs, and therefore can be understood independently of the limits of arbitrage. Our
second departure is to argue that many non-fundamental demand shocks can be understood jointly
with limits of arbitrage within a setting that emphasizes ¯nancial institutions and agency. Indeed,
Mitchell et al. (2002) and Lamont & Thaler (2003) for the relative pricing of parent and subsidiary companies, and
Amihud & Mendelson (1991), Warga (1992) and Krishnamurthy (2002) for the on-the-run phenomenon.
3Behavioral explanations for the anomalies include Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong & Stein
(1999) and Barberis & Shleifer (2003). See also the survey by Barberis & Thaler (2003).
2arbitrage is often performed by specialized institutions such as hedge funds and investment banks,
and the trading strategies of these institutions are constrained by agency frictions. At the same
time, ¯nancial institutions and agency frictions are the source of many non-fundamental demand
shocks. In this sense, ¯nancial institutions do not necessarily correct anomalies, but can also cause
them. Research on the limits of arbitrage is currently evolving into a broader agenda emphasizing
the role of ¯nancial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This agenda has the potential
to o®er a uni¯ed explanation of many anomalies.
The emphasis on ¯nancial institutions and agency frictions is fruitful for the analysis of welfare
and public policy. Crises, including the recent one, show that government intervention can be
important for the smooth functioning of ¯nancial markets. In standard models, however, there is
no scope for such intervention because the equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Research on the limits of
arbitrage has the potential to deliver a more useful framework for designing and assessing public
policy. Indeed, this research takes a two-tiered view of ¯nancial markets: a core of sophisticated
arbitrageurs trade against mispricings, and in doing so provide liquidity to a periphery of less
sophisticated investors. Under this view, the ¯nancial health of arbitrageurs is crucial for the
smooth functioning of markets and the provision of liquidity. Understanding how ¯nancial health
is a®ected by arbitrageurs' trading decisions, and whether these decisions are socially optimal, can
guide public policy.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents examples of non-fundamental demand
shocks, emphasizing that they often stem from institutional considerations. Section 3 surveys im-
portant theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage, and nests them within
a simple model. It emphasizes the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental
and non-fundamental, (ii) costs of short-selling, (iii) leverage and margin constraints, and (iv) con-
straints on equity capital.4 While these are not the only costs faced by real-life arbitrageurs, they
are among the most important and have received signi¯cant attention in the literature. Besides
examining the implications of each type of cost for asset price behavior, Section 3 sketches how
these costs can be integrated into richer models that incorporate multiple assets and dynamics.
Such models have the potential to address a variety of anomalies|both of the type concerning
violations of the law of one price, and of the type concerning return predictability|and are the
subject of a rapidly growing literature. Finally, Section 4 discusses implications for welfare and
public policy.
4Risk is a cost when arbitrageurs are not fully diversi¯ed and bear a disproportionate share of the risk of arbitrage
trades. Undiversi¯cation is related to ¯nancial constraints, which we treat separately.
32 DEMAND SHOCKS
Models of limited arbitrage typically assume that some investors experience demand shocks that
can drive prices away from fundamental values. This section presents examples of such shocks and
their e®ects on prices. Shocks in the ¯rst example are probably best interpreted as arising from
behavioral considerations, while in the other examples they more likely arise from institutional
frictions.
2.1 Palm-3Com
Lamont & Thaler (2003) study the sale of Palm by its parent company 3Com and the behavior of
the two companies' stock prices around this event. On March 2, 2000, 3Com sold 5% of its stake
in Palm through an initial public o®ering (IPO). 3Com also announced that it would spin o® its
remaining stake in Palm to 3Com shareholders before the end of the year. Under the terms of the
spin o®, 3Com shareholders would receive 1.525 shares of Palm for each share of 3Com they owned.
The law of one price implies that prior to the spin o®, 3Com shares should have been trading
at a price exceeding 1.525 times the price of Palm shares. This is because one 3Com share was
equivalent to 1.525 shares of Palm plus an equity claim to 3Com's remaining (non-Palm) assets,
and the latter claim had non-negative value because of limited liability. The law of one price was,
however, violated for a period of approximately two months starting from the IPO. For example, on
the day of the IPO, Palm closed at $95.06 per share, implying a lower bound of 1.525£95.06=$145
for the share price of 3Com. 3Com, however, closed at $81.81 per share, having dropped from
$104.13 on the previous day. Under these prices the implied value of 3Com's non-Palm assets was
-$22 billion, implying an economically signi¯cant violation of the law of one price.
Explaining the mispricing between Palm and 3Com is a challenge to standard models of asset
pricing. One must explain, in particular, why some investors were willing to buy Palm shares for
$95.06, while they could acquire them at a lower cost by buying 3Com shares. The most plausible
explanations are based on investors' psychological biases and cognitive limitations. Investors buying
Palm were possibly not sophisticated enough to appreciate the opportunity of buying it through
3Com. Moreover, because Palm was a manufacturer of a relatively new product (handheld devices),
it was possibly associated with the \new economy" to an extent higher than 3Com. This might have
led investors overly optimistic about the new economy to be willing to pay a disproportionately
high price for Palm.
42.2 Index E®ects
Index e®ects stem from a stock's addition to or deletion from prominent market indices. Starting
with Harris & Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986), a number of papers document that addition to the
Standard and Poor (S&P)'s 500 index raises the price of a stock, while deletion lowers its price.
For example, Chen et al. (2004) ¯nd that during 1989-2000, a stock's price would increase by an
average 5.45% on the day of the announcement that the stock would be added to the index, and a
further 3.45% from the announcement day to the day of the actual addition. Conversely, a stock's
price would decrease by an average 8.46% on the day of the announcement that the stock would
be deleted from the index, and a further 5.97% from the announcement day to the deletion day.
These e®ects are economically signi¯cant.
Standard models can account for index e®ects only if additions and deletions convey information
about assets' fundamental values. Even if one is to accept, however, that S&P has an informational
advantage relative to the market, it is hard to explain why this advantage (i) grew larger after 1989,
which is when index e®ects became the most signi¯cant, and (ii) can be so large to account for
the observed index e®ects. A more plausible explanation is that index additions and deletions
trigger changes in the demand by mutual funds. Indeed, passively managed mutual funds track
indices mechanically, while actively managed funds benchmark their performance against indices.
If, therefore, a stock is added to the S&P500 index, funds that track or are benchmarked against the
index are eager to buy the stock, and this can raise the stock's price. The institutional explanation
is consistent with the growth of index e®ects in recent decades since this parallels the growth of
institutional investing, index tracking and benchmarking.
Boyer (2007) provides further evidence consistent with the institutional explanation. He focuses
on the BARRA value and growth indices, which consist of value and growth stocks, respectively.
Unlike the S&P500 index, BARRA indices are constructed using publicly disclosed rules, so addi-
tions and deletions do not signal any private information. Boyer ¯nds that \marginal value" stocks,
de¯ned as those that just switched from the growth into the value index, comove signi¯cantly more
with the value than with the growth index, while the opposite is true for \marginal growth" stocks.
These e®ects are hard to explain within standard models because marginal value stocks have very
similar characteristics to marginal growth stocks. On the other hand, it is plausible that these
e®ects arise from shifts in demand by mutual funds. For example, in°ows into funds tracking the
value index trigger purchases of all stocks in that index, and this can raise the prices of these stocks
simultaneously. The institutional explanation is further strengthened by Boyer's ¯nding that the
5e®ects appear only after 1992, which is when the BARRA indices were introduced.5
2.3 Fire Sales by Mutual Funds
Mutual funds respond to out°ows by selling stocks in their portfolios. Coval & Sta®ord (2007) study
the behavior of stock prices around sales driven by large out°ows. They de¯ne ¯re sales as the sales
by the 10% of funds that experience the largest out°ows within a given quarter. For each stock,
they compute the fraction of average volume generated by ¯re sales, and they focus on the 10% of
stocks for which this fraction is largest. These stocks exhibit a V-shaped price pattern. During the
¯re-sale quarter and the quarter immediately preceding, their average cumulative abnormal return
is -7.9%. This price decline is followed by a recovery: during the year following the ¯re-sale quarter,
the average cumulative abnormal return is 6.1%. This return rises to 9.7% during the 18 months
following the ¯re-sale quarter.6
The slow and predictable price recovery is a challenge to standard models. Indeed, standard
models can account for an increase in expected return only through an increase in the covariance
with aggregate consumption. Explaining why this covariance increases for stocks sold by distressed
mutual funds, and why such an increase can account for an annual abnormal return of 6% is
di±cult. A more plausible explanation is that sales by distressed mutual funds generate price
pressure, pushing prices below fundamental values and raising expected returns going forward.
This explanation is related to institutional frictions: distressed sales are likely to be triggered by
investors who lose con¯dence in the quality of managers running underperforming funds.
2.4 U.K. Pension Reform and the Term Structure
Demand shocks are likely to also a®ect prices outside the U.S. and for assets other than stocks, as
our last example illustrates. It concerns the impact of the U.K. pension reform on the term structure
of interest rates, an episode described in greater detail in Greenwood & Vayanos (2010a). A major
objective of U.K. pension reform over the past twenty years has been to ensure the transparency and
solvency of pension funds; indeed, the reform was motivated partly by the failure of the Maxwell
pension fund in the early 1990s. The reform stipulated that pension funds had to meet a minimum
ratio of assets to liabilities. Pension-fund assets, such as stocks and bonds, are publicly traded and
5Earlier evidence linking index membership to comovement is in Vijh (1994) and Barberis et al. (2005). Both
papers focus on the S&P 500 index.
6Related evidence suggesting that fund out°ows have large price e®ects is in Anton & Polk (2008), Jotikasthira
et al. (2009), Greenwood & Thesmar (2009) and Lou (2009).
6can be valued using market prices. On the other hand, pension-fund liabilities are not traded, and
their valuation requires a suitable discount rate. Under the Pensions Act of 2004, this discount rate
had to be the yield on long-term in°ation-linked government bonds, on the grounds that pension
liabilities are long term and indexed to in°ation.
Pension funds responded to the reform by buying large amounts of long-term bonds. Indeed,
because long-term bonds were providing the discount rate to calculate the value of pension liabilities,
they were also the best hedge for these liabilities. Pension-fund purchases had a signi¯cant impact
on the term structure, especially at the long end. For example, in late 2003, the in°ation-indexed
bonds maturing in 2016 and 2035 had approximately the same yield. During 2004 and 2005,
however, the yield of the 2035 bond fell relative to that of the 2016 bond, with the spread reaching
an all-time low of -0.49% in January 2006. At that time, the 2035 and 2055 bonds had yields of
0.72% and 0.48%, respectively, which are extremely low relative to the historical average of 3% of
long real rates in the U.K. In accordance with the generally-held view that long yields had decreased
because of demand by pension funds, the government agreed in 2005 to issue bonds with maturities
of up to 50 years, while also shifting the overall mix of maturities towards the long term.
The inversion at the long end of the U.K. term structure is hard to rationalize within standard
representative-agent models. Indeed, in these models the interest rate for maturity T is determined
by the willingness of the representative agent to substitute consumption between times 0 and T.
Therefore, these models would attribute the drop in the 30-year interest rate to the unlikely scenario
that the pension reform signalled a drop in aggregate consumption 30 years into the future. In a
similar spirit, the expectations hypothesis of the term structure would attribute the drop in the
2035-2016 yield spread to expectations about short-term interest rates past 2016 decreasing sharply
during 2004 and 2005. A more plausible explanation is that the reform triggered high demand for
long-term bonds by pension funds, and that generated price pressure.
2.5 Summary
The examples in this section describe a variety of demand shocks that had signi¯cant and long-
term price e®ects. A natural question is why arbitrageurs are unable to absorb such shocks and
bring prices back to fundamental values. For example, why don't arbitrageurs eliminate the abnor-
mally high expected returns following ¯re sales by buying the stocks in question? And why were
arbitrageurs unable to eliminate the Palm-3Com mispricing by shorting Palm and buying 3Com?
Using a simple model, we next examine the constraints faced by arbitrageurs and the implications
7for asset prices.
3 A SIMPLE MODEL
3.1 Cross-Asset Arbitrage and Intertemporal Arbitrage
We consider an economy where assets are traded in Period 1 and pay o® in Period 2. The riskless
rate is exogenous and equal to zero. There are two risky assets, A and B, paying o® dA and dB,
respectively. We denote by ¹ di and ¾i, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of di, i = A;B,
and by ½ the correlation between dA and dB. For tractability, we assume that dA and dB are jointly
normal, and modify this assumption in Section 3.4. The price pB of asset B is exogenous and
equal to the asset's expected payo® ¹ dB. The price pA of asset A is endogenously determined in
equilibrium. Our focus is on how shocks to the demand for asset A a®ect pA.
There are two types of agents: outside investors and arbitrageurs. Outside investors' demand
for asset A is inelastic and equal to u shares. We refer to u as the demand shock: it is a constant
parameter in this section, but becomes a stochastic shock in Section 3.2 where we introduce an
initial Period 0. Arbitrageurs are competitive, risk averse and maximize expected utility of wealth
W2 in Period 2. For tractability, we assume that utility is exponential. By possibly reinterpreting
the demand shock u as net demand, we normalize the supply of asset A to zero. Under this
normalization, the price of asset A in the absence of the demand shock (u = 0) equals the asset's
expected payo® ¹ dA.
A demand shock u 6= 0 can push the price of asset A away from the expected payo®. Ar-
bitrageurs trade to pro¯t from this discrepancy. Doing so, they also provide liquidity to outside
investors. Suppose, for example, that u is positive, in which case outside investors wish to buy asset
A. Arbitrageurs provide liquidity because they take the opposite side of this transaction, shorting
the asset and limiting the price rise. Liquidity is high when the demand shock's price impact is
small: if, for example, u is positive, high liquidity means that the price rise is small.
The model has two interpretations, capturing di®erent but closely related real-life arbitrage
situations. In the ¯rst \cross-asset arbitrage" interpretation, assets A and B are di®erent and
arbitrageurs use asset B to hedge their position in asset A. In the second \intertemporal arbitrage"
interpretation, arbitrageurs exploit discrepancies between the prices of the same asset at di®erent
points in time. In that interpretation, the arbitrageurs' positions in assets A and B represent trades
8that arbitrageurs execute in the same asset in di®erent periods. The two interpretations yield the
same basic insight: the price e®ects of demand shocks depend on the risk aversion of arbitrageurs
and on the risk that they cannot hedge away.
Cross-Asset Arbitrage
In Period 1, the arbitrageurs choose positions xA and xB in assets A and B to maximize
expected utility
¡E1 [exp(¡®W2)] (1)
subject to the budget constraint
W2 = W1 + xA(dA ¡ pA) + xB(dB ¡ pB); (2)
where ® denotes the risk aversion of arbitrageurs and W1 their wealth in Period 1.7 Substituting
(2) into (1), and using normality and the assumption that pB = ¹ dB, we ¯nd that arbitrageurs
maximize the mean-variance objective











The optimal demand for asset B is xB = ¡(½¾A=¾B)xA, i.e., arbitrageurs choose a position in asset
B to hedge that in asset A. The optimal demand for asset A is
xA =




Since asset A is in zero supply, the market-clearing condition is
xA + u = 0: (5)
Combining (4) and (5), we ¯nd the equilibrium price of asset A:
pA = ¹ dA + ®¾2
A(1 ¡ ½2)u: (6)
Eq. (6) highlights a number of properties. First, larger demand shocks have a larger price impact
(@pA=@u > 0). Second, a given demand shock u has a larger price impact when arbitrageurs are
7Our analysis of cross-asset arbitrage is related to Wurgler & Zhuravskaya (2002). As in our model, they take the
price of asset B to be exogenous and equal to the asset's expected payo®. Unlike in our model, however, they restrict
arbitrageurs' aggregate dollar investment in assets A and B to be zero.
9more risk averse (large ®) and asset A has a more uncertain payo® (large ¾A) because in both cases
arbitrageurs require more compensation to bear its risk. The shock's impact is also larger when
the payo® of asset A is less correlated with that of asset B (small j½j) because arbitrageurs are less
able to hedge their position in asset A using asset B. Thus, assets with higher idiosyncratic risk
and fewer substitutes are more sensitive to demand shocks. Note that in the extreme case where
assets A and B have identical payo®s (dA = dB, i.e., ½ = 1), the demand shock has no e®ect and
the two assets trade at the same price. Arbitrageurs are able to align the price of asset A fully with
that of asset B because they bear no risk in exploiting price discrepancies between the two assets.
Intertemporal Arbitrage
In cross-asset arbitrage, arbitrageurs exploit discrepancies between the prices of two assets
at a given point in time. We next consider intertemporal arbitrage, where arbitrageurs exploit
discrepancies between the prices of the same asset at di®erent points in time. To interpret our
model as one of intertemporal arbitrage, we split Period 1 into two subperiods, and assume that
positions in assets A and B represent trades in the same asset in the ¯rst and second subperiods,
respectively. The model so derived is a simpli¯ed version of Grossman & Miller (1988).
We denote by 1 and 1+, respectively, the ¯rst and second subperiod of Period 1, by d ´ dA = dB
the common payo® of assets A and B, by ¹ d and ¹ d+ the expectation of d as of subperiod 1 and
1+, respectively, and by ¾ and ¾+ the respective standard deviation of d. The expectation ¹ d+
is random as of subperiod 1 if new information arrives between subperiods 1 and 1+, and has
conditional variance ¾2 ¡ (¾+)2.8
Since in subperiod 1+ arbitrageurs can trade asset B, and at a price equal to its expected
payo®, they are not compensated for bearing risk. Therefore, their aggregate position in subperiod
1+ is zero, which means that their trade in subperiod 1+, i.e., in asset B, is the opposite of that in
subperiod 1, i.e., in asset A. Using dA = dB = d, pB = ¹ d+ and xA = ¡xB, we can write (2) as
W2 = W1 + xA(¹ d+ ¡ pA): (7)
Substituting (7) into (1), we ¯nd that arbitrageurs choose their position in asset A in subperiod 1
to maximize the mean-variance objective



















10The optimal demand for asset A is
xA =
¹ d ¡ pA
®[¾2 ¡ (¾+)2]
: (8)
Combining (8) with the market-clearing condition (5), we ¯nd the equilibrium price of asset A:




The demand shock has a larger price impact when arbitrageurs are more risk averse (large ®)
and bear more risk. The relevant risk is that between subperiods 1 and 1+, and is measured by
¾2 ¡ (¾+)2. This is because arbitrageurs o®set their risky position in subperiod 1 by an opposite
position in subperiod 1+. In the extreme case where subperiods 1 and 1+ coincide, ¾ = ¾+ and
the demand shock has no e®ect. As Grossman & Miller emphasize, the time between subperiods
1 and 1+ can be interpreted as the time it takes for enough risk-bearing capacity to arrive in
the market and fully eliminate the e®ect of the demand shock.9 The two interpretations of our
model correspond to di®erent real-life arbitrageur situations and, accordingly, to di®erent strands
of empirical studies. From an asset-pricing theory viewpoint, however, they are isomorphic. From
now on, we focus on the cross-asset arbitrage interpretation of the model, and enrich it in ways
that illustrate developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. The results we derive carry
through to the intertemporal arbitrage interpretation.
3.2 Non-Fundamental Risk
In our baseline model, the risk borne by arbitrageurs is \fundamental risk," arising from asset
payo®s. An additional type of risk stems from demand shocks when these a®ect prices. DeLong
et al. (DSSW 1990) label this type of risk \noise-trader risk." We use instead the term \non-
fundamental risk" to emphasize that while demand shocks may be unrelated to asset payo®s, they
can be generated from rational behavior as the examples in Section 2 illustrate. To introduce
non-fundamental risk in our model, we assume that the variables ¹ dA, ¹ dB and u, which are constant
parameters as of Period 1, are random as of an initial Period 0. Fundamental risk in Period 0 arises
because prices in Period 1 depend on ¹ dA and ¹ dB. Non-fundamental risk arises because asset A's
price in Period 1 depends on u. We assume that fundamental risk in Period 0 is the same as in
9A recent literature derives the slow arrival of new investors from search costs. See, for example, Weill (2007),
Du±e et al. (2008), Du±e & Strulovici (2009) and Lagos et al. (2009). See also He and Xiong (2008), who derive
capital immobility and segmentation from agency frictions: preventing traders from moving across assets can provide
their employer with a better signal of their e®ort.
11Period 1, i.e., the standard deviation of ¹ di, i = A;B, is ¾i, and the correlation between ¹ dA and ¹ dB
is ½. We denote the standard deviation of u by ¾u, and assume that u is independent of ¹ dA and
¹ dB.






Eq. (10) shows that non-fundamental risk ¾u increases asset A's volatility. The e®ect is through the
second term inside the square root, which is the ratio of non-fundamental variance (®2¾4
A(1¡½2)2¾2
u)
to fundamental variance (¾2
A). This ratio is larger when the demand shock is less predictable (large
¾u) and when a given demand shock u has a larger price impact in Period 1. Consistent with (6),
price impact is larger when arbitrageurs are more risk averse (large ®), and the payo® of asset A is
more uncertain (large ¾A) and less correlated with the payo® of asset B (small j½j).
Eqs. (6) and pB = ¹ dB imply that the correlation, as of Period 0, between the prices of assets







Eq. (11) shows that non-fundamental risk lowers the correlation between assets A and B. This is
because it increases the volatility of asset A without a®ecting asset B.
Consider next an arbitrageur who takes a position in assets A and B in Period 0 in response
to a demand shock in that period. Since non-fundamental risk increases asset A's volatility and
lowers its correlation with asset B, it increases the volatility of the arbitrageur's return in Period
1. This volatility matters when the arbitrageur has a short horizon and must close his position in
Period 1. Price volatility caused by demand shocks in Period 1 deters such an arbitrageur from
absorbing demand shocks in Period 0. DSSW build on this idea to show that non-fundamental
risk can be self-ful¯lling. They assume a discrete-time in¯nite-horizon economy with an exogenous
riskless rate r and an asset paying a constant dividend r in each period. Since one share of the
second asset yields the same payo® as an investment of one dollar in the ¯rst asset, the law of
one price implies that the price of the second asset should be one. DSSW show, however, that
when arbitrageurs have a one-period horizon an equilibrium exists in which this price is stochastic.
Intuitively, if arbitrageurs expect the price to be stochastic, demand shocks have an e®ect, and this
renders the price stochastic.
12The stochastic equilibrium of DSSW hinges on a number of assumptions. One is that arbi-
trageurs have short horizons: if they were in¯nitely lived, they would enforce the law of one price
through buy-and-hold strategies. Short horizons can be viewed as a reduced form for ¯nancial
constraints, as we show in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. A second critical assumption is that of an in¯nite
horizon: with a ¯nite horizon, the law of one price would hold.10 Lowenstein & Willard (2006)
show that even under these two assumptions, the law of one price would hold in DSSW if interest
rates were endogenized, prices were precluded from becoming negative, or borrowing limits were
imposed. But while DSSW's result on the failure of the law of one price may not be robust, their
broader point that non-fundamental risk is an impediment to arbitrage remains important.
3.3 Short-Selling Costs
In our analysis so far, the only cost arbitrageurs face is risk. Additional costs, however, stem from
the way arbitrageur positions are established and ¯nanced. Arbitrageurs often establish their po-
sitions in the repo market. For example, an arbitrageur wishing to establish a long position in an
asset can borrow some of the needed cash by posting the asset as collateral|a repo transaction.
Conversely, an arbitrageur wishing to establish a short position in an asset can borrow (to subse-
quently sell) the asset by posting cash as collateral|a reverse repo transaction. The interest rate
earned on the cash, known as the repo rate, can di®er across assets and this can be a source of
arbitrage costs. For example, shorting an asset that carries a low repo rate relative to other assets
is costly because the cash collateral posted by the short-seller earns a below-market interest rate.
Costs involved in establishing and ¯nancing positions are often referred to as holding costs.
Tuckman & Vila (1992, 1993) introduce exogenous holding costs and show that they prevent arbi-
trageurs from eliminating mispricings. Arbitrageurs trade against mispricings only when these are
large enough to compensate them for the holding costs they incur. Dow & Gorton (1994) show
that holding costs can have disproportionately large e®ects when they are incurred by a sequence
of short-horizon arbitrageurs.
Short-selling costs are holding costs associated with short positions. We introduce short-selling
costs in our model by assuming that shorting asset A involves a cost c per share. Arbitrageurs
maximize the objective











10Our model con¯rms this: if assets A and B have the same payo®, the correlation ½ is one, and the non-fundamental
risk in (10) and (11) disappears.
13where 1S is equal to one if condition S is satis¯ed and zero otherwise. Eq. (12) is derived from (3) by
subtracting the cost cjxAj of holding a short position xA in asset A. Solving for the optimal demand
for asset A and combining with the market-clearing condition (5), we ¯nd that the equilibrium price
of asset A is given by
pA = ¹ dA + ®¾2
A(1 ¡ ½2)u if u · 0; (13a)
pA = ¹ dA + ®¾2
A(1 ¡ ½2)u + c if u > 0: (13b)
Short-selling costs a®ect the price only when the demand shock u is positive because this is when
arbitrageurs hold a short position. The price increases by an amount equal to the short-selling cost
c, so that arbitrageurs are compensated for incurring c.
Short-selling costs have an e®ect even when the assets have identical payo®s, and in that case
they cause the law of one price to be violated. Setting ½ = 1 in (13b), we ¯nd pA = ¹ d + c, where ¹ d
denotes the expected payo® of the two assets (¹ d ´ ¹ dA = ¹ dB). Therefore, when the demand shock
u is positive, the price of asset A is higher than the price of the identical-payo® asset B by an
amount equal to the short-selling cost c. This analysis maps to the Palm-3Com example: c can
be interpreted as the cost of shorting Palm and u as the demand by investors eager to hold Palm
over 3Com. D'Avolio (2002) and Lamont & Thaler (2003) report that c was large and prevented
arbitrageurs from exploiting the mispricing.
In our model, the short-selling cost c is an exogenous deadweight loss. A number of papers
seek to endogenize c based on frictions in the repo market. In Du±e (1996), short-sellers have the
choice between two assets with identical payo®s but di®erent exogenous transaction costs. They
prefer to short the low transaction cost asset, and their demand to borrow that asset in the repo
market lowers the repo rate, driving up the short-selling cost. The friction in the repo market
is that asset owners must incur an exogenous transaction cost to lend their asset. Unlike in our
model, the short-selling cost c is not a deadweight loss, but accrues to asset owners. Therefore,
it is an additional payo® earned from holding the asset and increases the asset price|even in the
absence of any positive demand shock u. Krishnamurthy (2002) uses a similar model to show that
a price premium arising from short-selling costs can coexist with a premium arising from an asset's
superior liquidity.
Du±e et al. (2002) model the repo market as a search market in which asset borrowers and
lenders negotiate bilaterally. The search friction generates a short-selling cost, which increases in
the demand for short-selling. Vayanos & Weill (2008) show that the combination of a search spot
market and a search repo market yields violations of the law of one price|even in the absence of
14any exogenous di®erences in transaction costs. Short-sellers concentrate on the more liquid asset,
and their activity is what renders the asset more liquid. The more liquid asset carries a price
premium both because of its superior liquidity and because high demand for short-selling drives up
short-selling costs.
In the extreme case where short-selling costs are in¯nite, they amount to short-sale constraints,
whose implications for asset prices are examined in a number of papers. Miller (1977) shows that
when short-sales are not allowed, pessimistic investors are unable to trade and prices re°ect the
valuation of the most optimistic investors. Harrison & Kreps (1978) show that with multiple trading
periods, prices even exceed the valuation of investors who are currently the most optimistic. Indeed,
these investors have the option to resell the asset should other investors become more optimistic
in future periods. Scheinkman & Xiong (2003) determine asset prices and the value of the resale
option in a continuous-time model where di®erences in beliefs stem from overcon¯dence. Hong
et al. (2006) show that overpricing and the value of the resale option are highest for assets with
low °oat. Diamond & Verrecchia (1987) show that short-sale constraints do not cause overpricing
when di®erences in beliefs stem from private signals rather than an agreement to disagree. Indeed,
the market adjusts rationally for the fact that investors with negative private signals are unable
to trade. Bai et al. (2006) show that short-sale constraints can cause underpricing because they
generate uncertainty about the extent of negative private information. Hong & Stein (2003) show
that the occasional release of negative private information can be the source of market crashes.
3.4 Leverage Constraints
In our analysis so far, there is no role for arbitrageur capital: while portfolio decisions and asset
prices depend on arbitrageur risk aversion, they are independent of arbitrageur wealth. Wealth does
not matter because of the simplifying assumption that arbitrageurs have exponential utility, i.e.,
their coe±cient of absolute risk aversion is independent of wealth. Yet, the capital available to real-
life arbitrageurs appears to be an important determinant of their ability to eliminate mispricings
and provide liquidity to other investors.
The study of arbitrageur wealth e®ects is related to that of ¯nancial constraints. Indeed, an
important theme in the literature on the limits of arbitrage is that arbitrageurs are sophisticated
traders, better able to identify mispricings than other, less sophisticated investors. Since capital
in the hands of arbitrageurs can earn higher return, other investors can gain by investing their
capital with arbitrageurs. If, however, arbitrageurs could access external capital frictionlessly, they
15would be able to eliminate mispricings, and asset prices and allocations would be as in standard
models. Thus, while arbitrageur capital can exceed the arbitrageurs' personal wealth, it appears
to be limited by ¯nancial constraints.
In this section we study constraints on arbitrageurs' ability to acquire leverage by raising
margin debt. We assume that assets A and B have identical payo®s. This isolates the e®ects of
leverage constraints from those of risk: arbitrageurs bear no risk when exploiting a price discrepancy
between assets A and B, and such a discrepancy can arise solely because of leverage constraints.
To model leverage constraints, we focus on the mechanics of collateral in the repo market, following
Geanakoplos (1997; 2003). We also assume that arbitrageurs must collateralize their positions in
each asset separately. The model so derived is a simpli¯ed version of Gromb & Vayanos (2002;
2010).
Consider an arbitrageur wishing to establish a long position xi in asset i. The arbitrageur can
borrow some of the needed cash by posting asset i as collateral. The borrowed cash is typically
less than the market value xipi of the asset collateral; otherwise, a drop in the asset price would
cause the value of the collateral to drop below that of the loan. To determine the size of the loan,
we assume for simplicity that margin loans have to be riskless and that competitive lenders set
the rate equal to the riskless rate (which is zero). Riskless loans are not feasible when the payo®
d of the two assets is normal, and we assume instead that d is distributed symmetrically over the
bounded support [¹ d ¡ ²; ¹ d + ²], where ¹ d ¸ ². An arbitrageur wishing to establish a long position xi
in asset i can thus borrow a maximum of xi(¹ d ¡ ²), and must pay the remainder
xi
¡




out of his wealth. The parameter m+
i is the margin (or haircut) for a long position in asset i.11
Consider next an arbitrageur wishing to establish a short position xi in asset i. The arbitrageur
can borrow (and subsequently sell) asset i posting cash as collateral. The cash collateral typically
exceeds the proceeds jxijpi from the sale of the borrowed asset; otherwise, an increase in the asset
price would cause the value of the loan to rise above that of the collateral. As for long positions,
we assume that margin loans have to be riskless and that competitive asset lenders pay the riskless
rate on the cash collateral.12 An arbitrageur wishing to establish a short position xi in asset i must
11An alternative to requiring margin loans to be riskless is to allow for default and impose an upper bound on its
probability. This would yield a constraint of the same form as (14), which would be interpreted as a value-at-risk
constraint.
12This assumption eliminates the short-selling costs of Section 3.3.
16post jxij(¹ d + ²) units of cash as collateral. Selling the asset yields jxijpi units, and the remainder
jxij




must be drawn from the arbitrageur's wealth. The parameter m¡
i is the margin (or haircut) for
a short position in asset i. Note that the margin requirements m+
i and m¡
i are increasing in the
parameter ², which is a measure of the volatility of asset i. Indeed, volatility increases the maximum
loss that a long or short position can experience.
From (14) and (15), the positions xA and xB of an arbitrageur with wealth W1 must satisfy











Arbitrageurs maximize expected utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the leverage
constraint (16).
When can arbitrageurs eliminate price discrepancies between assets A and B, thus enforcing the
law of one price? The market-clearing condition (5) requires that arbitrageurs absorb the demand
shock u, i.e., take a position xA = ¡u. If, in addition, assets A and B trade at a price equal to
their expected payo® ¹ d, then it is optimal for arbitrageurs not to bear risk and hold an o®setting
position xB = u in asset B. Since for pA = pB = ¹ d the margins m+
i and m¡
1 are equal to ², the
leverage constraint (16) is satis¯ed if
W1 ¸ 2juj²: (17)
Arbitrageurs can enforce the law of one price if their wealth W1 is large relative to the demand shock
u and the margin requirement ². In that case, the demand shock has no e®ect on the price of asset
A and the market is perfectly liquid. Intuitively, arbitrageurs can provide perfect liquidity when
their wealth is large because the leverage constraint is not binding. When, however, arbitrageur
wealth is small, the leverage constraint is binding and liquidity is imperfect.
Leverage constraints can give rise to ampli¯cation, whereby the e®ects of an exogenous shock
are ampli¯ed through changes in arbitrageur positions. Ampli¯cation can be derived in our model
by assuming that arbitrageurs enter Period 1 with a position from Period 0, and that outside
investors' demand is elastic. If, for example, arbitrageurs enter Period 1 with a long position, then
a negative demand shock u lowers the price pA, thus lowering arbitrageur wealth W1 and tightening
17the leverage constraint (16). This can force arbitrageurs to liquidate positions, amplifying the
price drop. Note that when liquidating their positions, arbitrageurs consume rather than provide
liquidity. The liquidity providers are the outside investors, and their demand must be assumed
elastic so that they are willing to buy from arbitrageurs.
Leverage constraints and ampli¯cation have been studied in macroeconomic settings, starting
with Bernanke & Gertler (1989), Shleifer & Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). In these
papers, an adverse shock to economic activity depresses collateral values, and this can amplify the
drop in activity. Geanakoplos (1997; 2003) de¯nes the concept of a collateral equilibrium, where
margin contracts are derived endogenously. He shows that margins are tied to asset volatility as in
(14) and (15), and provides examples where margins increase following adverse shocks.
In a ¯nancial market context, Gromb & Vayanos (2002) study how leverage constraints af-
fect the ability of arbitrageurs to eliminate mispricings and provide liquidity to outside investors.
They show, within a dynamic setting, that liquidity increases in arbitrageur capital and that arbi-
trageurs can amplify exogenous shocks.13 Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) and Gromb & Vayanos
(2009a) extend this analysis to multiple assets in a static and dynamic setting, respectively. With
multiple assets, leverage constraints generate not only ampli¯cation, but also contagion, whereby
shocks to one asset are transmitted to otherwise unrelated assets through changes in arbitrageur
positions. Pavlova & Rigobon (2008) derive a contagion result in an international-economy model
with portfolio constraints, of which leverage constraints are a special case. Kondor (2009) shows
that ampli¯cation can arise even in the absence of exogenous shocks, purely as a consequence of
arbitrage activity. Indeed, if a price discrepancy between two assets were to remain constant or
decrease over time, arbitrageurs would exploit it and reduce it to a level from which it could in-
crease. Garleanu & Pedersen (2009) show that all else equal, assets with lower margin requirements
can trade at higher prices. Related results are derived in Cuoco (1997), Basak & Croitoru (2000;
2006) and Geanakoplos (2003). Other dynamic models with leverage constraints include Aiyagari
& Gertler (1999), Allen & Gale (2000), Anshuman & Viswanathan (2005), Geanakoplos & Fostel
(2008), Adrian et al. (2009), Chabakauri (2009), Danielsson et al. (2009) and Rytchkov (2009).14
13Weill (2007) derives a link between arbitrageur capital and liquidity provision in a search model. See also Du±e &
Strulovici (2009), who use a search model to study the gradual °ow of arbitrage capital across trading opportunities.
14See also Yuan (2005) for a model in which leverage constraints hamper the revelation of private information, and
Grossman & Vila (1992), Liu & Longsta® (2004), Jurek & Yang (2007) and Milbradt (2009) for partial-equilibrium
models of portfolio choice by leverage-constrained investors. Ampli¯cation and contagion can also be derived in
models without explicit leverage constraints but where arbitrageur risk aversion depends on wealth. This is done in
Kyle & Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001), who endow arbitrageurs with logarithmic utility, under which the coe±cient
of absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth. Following adverse shocks, arbitrageurs reduce their positions because
they become more risk averse and not because they hit leverage constraints.
183.5 Constraints on Equity Capital
In addition to constraints on margin debt, arbitrageurs often face constraints in raising equity.
For example, the equity of a mutual fund is determined by the °ow of investors into the fund,
and could be lower than the level at which the fund's pro¯table investment opportunities are fully
exploited. Moreover, poor returns by the fund could trigger out°ows by investors, and so render the
fund more constrained. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) study the implications of constraints on equity
capital for arbitrageurs' ability to exploit mispricings. They show that constraints give rise to
ampli¯cation, via a mechanism akin to that for leverage constraints. Suppose that arbitrageurs
hold long positions in an asset. A negative shock to the asset lowers its price and triggers out°ows
by investors in arbitrage funds. As a consequence, arbitrageurs are forced to reduce their positions,
amplifying the price drop. These results can be derived in our model by assuming that (i) part of
arbitrageur wealth belongs to other investors, and is withdrawn following poor returns in Period
1, (ii) arbitrageurs cannot borrow, (iii) arbitrageurs enter Period 1 with a position from Period 0,
and (iv) outside investors' demand is elastic.
Shleifer & Vishny show additionally that constraints have an e®ect not only when they are
binding, but also because of the possibility that they might bind in the future. Indeed, suppose
that arbitrageurs with ample capital in Period 0 identify an underpriced asset. Investing heavily
in that asset exposes them to the risk of large out°ows by investors were the underpricing to
worsen in Period 1. This would deprive arbitrageurs of capital when they need it the most since
this is when the underpricing is the most extreme. As a consequence, arbitrageurs could refrain
from investing heavily in the underpriced asset in Period 0, keeping instead some capital in cash.
Arbitrageurs' strategy of seeking to match capital with pro¯table investment opportunities amounts
to risk management. Risk management by arbitrageurs is also derived in models with leverage
constraints, e.g., Gromb & Vayanos (2002), Liu & Longsta® (2004), Brunnermeier & Pedersen
(2009) and Kondor (2009), and is further emphasized in Acharya et al. (2009) and Bolton et al.
(2009). Holmstrom & Tirole (2001) explore the implications of risk management by ¯rms for the
cross-sectional pricing of assets. They show that assets paying o® in states where ¯rms' ¯nancial
constraints bind are more expensive than assets paying o® in other states because they provide
capital when it is needed the most.
A number of papers integrate constraints on the equity capital available to arbitrage funds|
and especially its dependence on past performance|into dynamic settings. In Vayanos (2004),
fund managers face the constraint that their fund will be liquidated following poor performance,
19and this makes them unwilling to hold illiquid assets at times of high volatility. In He & Krish-
namurthy (2008; 2009), the capital available to fund managers cannot exceed a ¯xed multiple of
their personal wealth|a constraint derived from optimal contracting under moral hazard. When
managers underperform, the constraint becomes binding and causes volatility and risk premia to
increase. Guerrieri & Kondor (2009) derive ampli¯cation e®ects from managers' reputation con-
cerns.15 In Vayanos & Woolley (2008), investors withdraw capital following underperformance by
fund managers because they infer rationally that managers might be ine±cient. If, in addition,
withdrawals have to be gradual, they generate short-run momentum and long-run reversal in asset
returns.16
3.6 Summary and Next Steps
Sections 3.1-3.5 show how an array of costs faced by arbitrageurs limit their ability to eliminate
mispricings and provide liquidity to outside investors. We next sketch what we view as two impor-
tant next steps in this research agenda: (i) derive the ¯nancial constraints of arbitrageurs within an
optimal contracting framework, and (ii) integrate limits-of-arbitrage ideas into richer models that
incorporate multiple assets and dynamics and that can be used to address empirical puzzles.
As Sections 3.4 and 3.5 emphasize, arbitrageurs face ¯nancial constraints stemming from agency
problems with their providers of capital. Most of the papers referenced in these sections do not fully
endogenize the constraints. For example, papers on leverage constraints typically rule out equity
and papers on equity constraints typically rule out debt. Deriving ¯nancial constraints within an
optimal contracting framework is an important next step. Indeed, while the constraints studied in
the literature take a variety of forms, they tend to generate results in common, e.g., ampli¯cation,
contagion, and risk management by arbitrageurs. Endogenizing the constraints would help identify
whether the common results are driven by a single underlying friction, or whether the constraints
are fundamentally di®erent. Identifying the frictions that underlie the constraints would also be
useful for policy analysis, as it would clarify what a regulator can and cannot do to alleviate the
e®ects of the constraints.
Starting with Kehoe and Levine (1993), a macroeconomic literature explores the asset pric-
ing implications of ¯nancial constraints when these derive from limited commitment by borrowers.
15Reputation concerns are also explored in Dasgupta & Prat (2008), Dasgupta et al. (2008), and Malliaris & Yan
(2009).
16Other papers studying general equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management include Cuoco &
Kaniel (2009), Petajisto (2009), Basak & Pavlova (2010) and Kaniel & Kondor (2010).
20Limited commitment is also the source of the constraints in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), while Holm-
strom & Tirole (2001) derive the constraints from moral hazard. Constrained agents in these papers
are real-economy ¯rms having access to productive technologies not available to other investors.
The interpretation of constrained agents as ¯nancial ¯rms is made explicit in He & Krishnamurthy
(2008; 2009), who derive constraints on fund managers uniquely able to invest in a subset of traded
assets. The constraints derive from moral hazard and contracts are restricted to be static.17 Ex-
tending this line of research to dynamic contracts, while retaining the tractability that is necessary
to compute asset prices in general equilibrium, would be an important step forward. A recent
literature on optimal dynamic ¯nancial contracting in continuous time, e.g., Biais et al. (2007)
and DeMarzo & Fishman (2007), could be useful in this respect. The result of that literature
that investors punish underperforming managers by scaling down their ¯rms ¯ts with the idea that
investors reduce their stakes in underperforming funds.18
Our understanding of the costs faced by arbitrageurs has greatly bene¯ted from papers explor-
ing these costs in simple stylized settings. An important next step is to integrate limits-of-arbitrage
ideas more squarely into asset pricing theory by developing tractable dynamic multi-asset models
that can address empirical puzzles. Work along these lines could take constraints as given and so
proceed in parallel with work on optimal contracting|although an important long-term objective
is that the two lines of research eventually merge.
A number of papers explore dynamic multi-asset equilibrium settings under the assumption that
the only cost faced by arbitrageurs is risk. In Greenwood (2005) and Hau (2009a), arbitrageurs
absorb demand shocks of index investors following index rede¯nitions. In Gabaix et al. (2007),
arbitrageurs are uniquely able to hold mortgage-backed securities, and while they can hedge interest-
rate risk in the government bond market, they bear prepayment risk. In Garleanu et al. (2009),
arbitrageurs absorb demand shocks in the options market, and while they can hedge delta risk in
the stock market, they bear jump and volatility risk. In Vayanos & Vila (2009) and Greenwood &
Vayanos (2010b), arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the demand and supply of government bonds with
speci¯c maturities, and hedge by trading bonds with other maturities. A common theme in these
papers is that arbitrageurs transmit shocks to the demand for one asset to other assets, with the
e®ects being largest for assets that covary the most with the original asset. This has implications
for phenomena as diverse as index e®ects in the stock market, the pricing of prepayment risk in
17See also Acharya & Viswanathan (2009), who derive constraints from asset substitution, and Hombert and
Thesmar (2009) and Stein (2009), who study arbitrageurs' choice between short- and long-term ¯nancing.
18Bolton & Scharfstein (1990) and Gromb (1994) derive this result in ¯nite-horizon discrete-time settings, and
Heinkel & Stoughton (1994) derive the result in a two-period fund-management setting. See also Biais et al. (2010),
who show the converse result that investors reward overperforming managers by scaling up their ¯rms.
21the mortgage market, the behavior of implied volatility surfaces in the options market, and the
behavior of risk premia in the government bond market. Hau (2009b), Jylha & Suominen (2009)
and Plantin & Shin (2009) pursue similar themes for the foreign exchange market, and Naranjo
(2009) does so for the futures market.
Other papers explore dynamic multi-asset equilibrium settings under the assumption that ar-
bitrageurs face ¯nancial constraints. These papers are referenced in the last paragraph of Section
3.4 for the case of leverage constraints and Section 3.5 for the case of constraints on equity capital.
They constitute a rapidly growing literature which has the potential to explain a variety of market
anomalies based on limits of arbitrage and institutional frictions more broadly.
4 WELFARE AND POLICY
Financial crises, including the recent one, provide a painful reminder that government intervention
can be important for the smooth functioning of ¯nancial markets. Arguments for intervention often
center around the idea that failing ¯nancial institutions can cause disruptions in asset markets and
the e®ects can propagate to other institutions. Standard models of asset pricing cannot be used
to evaluate the merits of such arguments because they abstract away from ¯nancial frictions and
institutions. In these models equilibrium is Pareto optimal and there is no scope for intervention.19
Research on the limits of arbitrage has the potential to deliver a more useful framework for designing
and assessing public policy. Indeed, this research emphasizes the role of specialized institutions in
providing liquidity in asset markets. Understanding how the ¯nancial health of these institutions
is a®ected by their trading decisions, and whether trading decisions are socially optimal, can guide
public policy. Despite its relevance, the welfare analysis of asset markets with limited arbitrage is
still in its infancy. In this section we survey the existing work and highlight what we view as the
main issues, challenges and promises.
We start by clarifying some methodological issues. Several papers study whether constrained
arbitrageurs stabilize or destabilize asset prices, i.e., decrease or increase volatility. This is only
indirectly a welfare question; assessing welfare by means of a utility-based criterion, such as Pareto,
is preferable. Given a welfare criterion, a natural question is whether constraints lower e±ciency,
i.e., is unconstrained arbitrage better than constrained arbitrage?20 This question, however, is
19The same is true for models in which arbitrageur wealth e®ects derive from wealth-dependent risk aversion rather
than explicit ¯nancial constraints (e.g., Kyle & Xiong (2001) and Xiong (2001)).
20A related question is whether the presence of arbitrageurs is bene¯cial, i.e., is constrained arbitrage better than
no arbitrage at all? One would expect the two questions to generally have a positive answer: relaxing constraints
should be desirable because arbitrageurs provide liquidity.
22of limited relevance for assessing policy. Indeed, if arbitrageurs face constraints, one should not
assume that a regulator could remove or even relax them. A more suitable criterion is constrained
e±ciency: can a regulator increase welfare relative to the equilibrium by choosing new allocations
that are nevertheless subject to the constraints? At this juncture, the literature has taken two
routes, which we discuss next.
The ¯rst route is to retain a traditional dynamic equilibrium asset pricing model, but not fully
endogenize the constraints. This is done in Gromb & Vayanos (2002), who study how leverage
constraints a®ect arbitrageurs' ability to provide liquidity. The main result in terms of welfare is
that equilibrium can fail to be constrained e±cient and a reduction in arbitrageur positions can
make all agents better o®. The intuition is as follows. Following an adverse shock, arbitrageurs
incur capital losses and are forced to liquidate positions because their leverage constraints tighten.
As a result, they ¯nd themselves more constrained and less able to provide liquidity|at a time
where liquidity is low and its provision pro¯table. Ex-ante, arbitrageurs account for this possibility
and engage in risk management by keeping some capital in cash to exploit episodes of low liquidity.
However, they fail to account for the impact of their liquidations on other arbitrageurs during such
episodes. Indeed, liquidation by one arbitrageur hurts other arbitrageurs because it lowers the price
at which they can liquidate. This can hurt not only arbitrageurs but also outside investors because
of the reduced liquidity that they receive.
The second route has been followed by papers in macroeconomics and international economics,
e.g., Caballero & Krishnamurthy (2001), Lorenzoni (2008), Acharya et al. (2009), Hombert (2009),
Korinek (2009). These papers derive ¯nancial constraints endogenously from contracting frictions
in three-period settings. The constraints, however, concern real-economy ¯rms having access to
productive technologies, rather than ¯nancial ¯rms such as arbitrageurs. Ine±ciencies in these
papers arise because of a similar mechanism as in the previous paragraph: ¯rms do not account for
the impact of their liquidations on the prices at which other ¯rms can liquidate.21
The mechanism causing the ine±ciencies is a pecuniary externality operating through price
changes and the redistribution of wealth that these generate. A redistribution of wealth cannot be
Pareto improving when markets are complete because marginal rates of substitution across time
and states of nature are identical for all agents. However, when markets are incomplete, as is
the case with ¯nancial constraints, marginal rates of substitution di®er and Pareto improvements
are possible. Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (1986) show this mechanism in a general incomplete-
21See also Biais & Mariotti (2009) for a similar ine±ciency in a labor economics context, and Nikolov (2009) for a
calibration of the ine±ciency.
23markets setting.22
This constrained ine±ciency of limited arbitrage opens the door for an analysis of policy (see
Gromb & Vayanos (2002; 2009b) for a discussion). Suppose, for example, that arbitrageurs take
excessive risk. A regulator might decrease their risk-taking incentives by tightening their ¯nancial
constraints with a risk-based capital requirement. Alternatively, better risk-management could be
enforced directly by taxing arbitrageurs in good times and possibly subsidizing them in bad times,
in e®ect managing part of their resources for them. Subsidies in bad times can be implemented
through lender of last resort policies or asset purchase programs.23 Last, imperfect competition
among arbitrageurs might lead them to internalize part of the price e®ects of their investment
decisions, possibly leading them to adopt more socially desirable investment policies. This research
agenda has the potential to inform debates on systemic risk, macro-prudential regulation, and
lending of last resort, topics that are highly relevant in the context of ¯nancial crises.
22See also Stiglitz (1982), who shows that in incomplete ¯nancial markets, the competitive equilibrium may fail to
be constrained e±cient.
23For a discussion of such policies, see Krishnamurthy (2009) and the references therein. Krishnamurthy argues
that such policies are desirable because they can move the market to a more e±cient equilibrium.
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